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Abstract—In the smart grid, an integrated distributed authen-
tication protocol is needed to not only securely manage the sys-
tem but also efficiently authenticate many different entities for the
communications. In addition, a lightweight authentication proto-
col is required to handle frequent authentications among billions
of devices. Unfortunately, in the literature, there is no such inte-
grated protocol that provides mutual authentication among the
home environment, energy provider, gateways, and advanced me-
tering infrastructure network. Therefore, in this paper, we propose
a lightweight cloud-trusted authorities-based integrated (centrally
controlled) distributed authentication protocol that provides mu-
tual authentications among communicated entities in a distributed
manner. Based on certificateless cryptosystem, our protocol is
lightweight and efficient even when there are invalid requests in
a batch. Security and performance analysis show that the protocol
provides privacy preservation, forward secrecy, semantic security,
perfect key ambiguous, and protection against identity thefts while
generating lower overheads in comparison with the existing proto-
cols. Also, the protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks,
redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, and denial-of-service
attacks. Moreover, our protocol provides a complete resistance
against flood-based denial-of-service attacks.
Index Terms—Authentication, cloud computing, denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks, redirection attacks, smart grid (SG).
I. INTRODUCTION
THE smart grid (SG) is a critical infrastructure whose ob-jective is to provide more efficient, secure, stable, and
reliable power to the consumers, operators, and utilities. The
SG system for home environment consists of various compo-
nents, such as smart meters (SM), home appliances (HA), energy
providers (EP), gateways (GW), and advanced metering infras-
tructure (AMI) network. It is generally assumed that the home
area network (HAN) is wirelessly connected with the Zigbee [1],
whereas the building area network (BAN)/neighborhood area
network (NAN) is connected by wide area network and cellular
technologies, such as global system for mobile communication
(GSM) and long term evolution (LTE) [2]. SMs are equipped
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Fig. 1. Overall architecture of the SG system.
with two communication interfaces, where one interface works
as a SM and other works as a HAN-GW. Therefore, the SM is a
central home controller that communicates with all HA within a
household. Further, the BAN-GW/NAN-GW acts as (or deploy)
an aggregator (AG) that receives data from the SM and forwards
it to the respective control center (CC) via relays and concentra-
tors with wired/wireless connections. Fig. 1 shows the overall
architecture of the SG system.
A. Motivation and Research Problem
Two-way communications in the SG enable instant interac-
tion between different SG entities and help to improve the over-
all efficiency of the SG system. According to the NIST report
[3], one of the main security issues in the SG system is that
existing authentication mechanisms do not sufficiently authen-
ticate devices or exposes authentication keys. Without proper
authentications, the system resources and entities can be com-
promised that may result in financial losses and performance
degradation [4]. Centrally control authentication in a decentral-
ized environment is required for the centralized security man-
agement in terms of event logging/analysis and authentication
[8], [9]. A fast and lightweight protocol is needed to support
frequent authentications repeated many times among billions of
devices. In sum, an integrated, distributed, fast, and lightweight
authentication protocol will provide mutual authentication be-
tween the various entities of the SG system. An integrated dis-
tributed protocol can help to maximize the utilization of shared
resources with low overhead. Furthermore, the security protocol
of the SG system must defend against known security attacks,
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including man-in-the-middle (MITM) and denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks [5].
In the subsequent parts of this section, we first discuss about
limitations and concerns of the existing protocols for command
and control information delivery. We also highlight the stan-
dardized protocols supporting authentication process along with
their limitations of not suitable for the SG system. Also, we raise
a point of user data privacy, which is not covered and maintained
by the existing protocols.
There are many different communication protocols used for
delivering commands and control information. However, these
protocols were not initially designed with security in mind. To-
day, when Internet is connected to the SG system, various orga-
nizations, such as ETSI, IEEE, and NIST are embedding security
to the existing protocols as new standards in order to prevent
the system against well-known security attacks. However, they
need to modify many communication standards to make them
security embedded. This creates additional overheads. Further-
more, researchers have not yet focused much on an integrated
protocol, rather they have proposed separate protocols for indi-
vidual connections between different entities in the SG. They
have not discussed the integration of these protocols for compat-
ible communication among them. This motivates us to propose
such an efficient and secure authentication protocol for the SG
system.
There are some standardized protocols available for the SG
that support authentication process, such as open smart grid
protocol (OSGP) for the SMs, distributed network protocol
(DNP3) between the CC and the substations, device language
message specification/companion specification for energy me-
tering (DLMS/COSEM) for the AMI network, and OpenADR for
the demand response program. In addition, other standardized
authentication protocols also exist, such as remote authentica-
tion dial-in user service (RADIUS) and Diameter protocols for
the 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular networks [11].
The OSGP protocol was deployed for providing the authen-
tication and confidential security to the SG applications. This
protocol is expected to provide reliable and efficient delivery
of command and control information between the SMs, direct
load control modules, GWs, and other SG devices. However,
recently, researchers from Germany recovered private encryp-
tion keys of the SMs in a system following OSGP without a
significant computational effort [12]. Also, a number of attacks
has been performed over the OSGP protocol [6], including one
with just 13 queries to a homegrown message authentication
code (OMA digest) oracle, and by which the protocol further
failed to deliver authenticity guarantee and confidentiality (due
to using a nonstandard composition of RC4 as weak encryp-
tion algorithm) [12]. Similar security issues were found in the
DNP3 protocol, which does not provide authentication, mes-
sage integrity, and confidentiality. In 2012, a new version of
the DNP3 protocol, named DNP3 secure authentication ver-
sion 5 was announced, which provides methods to remotely
change user update keys using either symmetric or asymmetric
cryptography [13]. However, DNP3 secure authentication con-
siders only spoofing, modification, and replay attacks over the
network, and does not provide confidentiality of the message.
Also, version 5 of the protocol is not backward compatible with
previous versions, which may add a heavy protocol replacement
cost.
Furthermore, the authentication provided by DLMS/COSEM,
OpenADR, RADIUS, and Diameter are not sufficient, and also
OpenADR is costly [11]. The DLMS (application layer com-
munication protocol) and COSEM (data model) together pro-
vide an interface model for metering applications [14]. How-
ever, DLMS/COSEM’s security services are restricted to use
symmetric key encryption. In practice, SMs need asymmetric
key to be used in secure socket layer/transport layer security
(TLS/SSL), but DLMS/COSEM does not support TLS/SSL. In
demand response, OpenADR, which is a standard development
effort, supports authentication based on public key cryptogra-
phy with exchange of certificates [15]. This standard maintains
a hierarchy of certified authorities and requires a PKI to use
three-tier PKI, which ultimately results in high development
cost.
RADIUS is commonly used protocol to provide centralized
remote user authentication and accounting in cellular networks,
and WLAN interworking and Wi-Fi offload situations [16].
However, the SG requires decentralized solutions, as a single-
point-of-failure can massively affect the centralized system.
RADIUS implementation supports peer authentication between
communication endpoints using a pre-shared key, which brings
key management issues and is not suitable for large systems,
such as SG. Furthermore, RADIUS has poor scalability and
uses the user datagram protocol (UDP), which does not provide
reliable data transfer. Therefore, RADIUS is not suitable for the
SG where the availability of information is extremely important.
On the other hand, Diameter protocol is an authentication,
authorization, and accounting protocol used in networking,
which supports transmission control protocol (TCP) instead
of UDP. However, its supported capabilities are sometimes
more expansive when a large number of entities are involved.
Furthermore, RADIUS and Diameter protocols do not directly
protect against DoS attacks carried out by flooding the target
equipment with bogus traffic.
There are several challenges with the current authentication
protocols in terms of efficiency, overhead, cost, delay, and pri-
vacy. Also, many vulnerabilities do exist in the available au-
thentication schemes of various communication protocols, such
as weak encryption and message digest in the OSGP protocol
[6], security issues in the DNP3 protocol [7] (even in version 5
[13]), etc. There is not yet an integrated distributed authentica-
tion protocol that provides mutual authentication between the
home environment (HA, SM, HAN-GW), EP, GWs (BAN-GW,
NAN-GW), and the AMI network (SM, AG/collector, CC). An
integrated protocol can provide a common platform for authen-
ticating various devices while efficiently maximizing the utiliza-
tion of shared resources with low overhead in the SG system.
Also, the privacy protection in the SG system is an important
requirement, so the protocol must not reveal the confidential
and private information related to any entity involved in the au-
thentication process. Therefore, an end user (consumer) should
have a control over his/her own home environment, such as HA,
since data generated and being sent belong to a particular user.
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Furthermore, the protocol must be fast and efficient, and should
be able to defeat known security attacks.
B. Protocol Design Challenges
There are several challenges in designing a centrally con-
trolled integrated distributed authentication protocol as we iden-
tified below.
1) The protocol should not only be controlled by a central
entity, but also by the subsystems of the SG network in a
distributed manner.
2) Embedding security solutions in each communication pro-
tocol of the SG network is not only highly complex but
also generates huge overhead and cost. Therefore, it would
be more flexible and efficient to instead design a cyber-
security layer over the communication network to main-
tain end-to-end security [10]. This simplifies the integra-
tion at the cyber-security layer by avoiding complex in-
tegration of different communication protocols in the SG
network.
3) The protocol should be able to utilize the available system
resources efficiently.
4) The generated overhead by the protocol should be as low
as possible. The protocol should be fast and lightweight, as
authentication process is frequently repeated many times
among billions of devices, especially, when devices re-
ceive multiple messages at once, such as when GWs au-
thenticate multiple SMs and gather data from them.
5) The protocol must utilize suitable cryptosystem (with
symmetric and/or asymmetric keys) as recommended by
standard organizations, such as IEEE, ETSI, and NIST.
Particularly, NIST report [8] emphasizes the issues of key
exchange in symmetric key cryptography and the public
key infrastructure (PKI) in asymmetric key cryptography.
Hence, key management issue must be considered in de-
sign.
6) The protocol should enable consumers to have security
control over his/her home, i.e., control over all HAs with
the SM.
7) The protocol must support secure communications over
the network with strong encryption. Moreover, the identity
of each device should be protected over the network to
maintain identity anonymity and untraceability.
8) The protocol must be able to defeat various well-known
security attacks, such as MITM attacks, redirection at-
tacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and flood-
based DoS attacks.
C. Our Contribution
In this paper, we design an integrated distributed protocol
for the SG network, which meets all the aforementioned chal-
lenges. Note that the proposed protocol may not be suitable for
some parts of the SG system with very low communication la-
tency requirements, such as for the generic object-oriented sub-
station event (GOOSE) and sampled measured values (SMV)
layer-2 messages within the substation. Here, messages are
not encrypted due to the transmission requirements within 4
ms. In such scenarios, a virtual LAN with layer-2 capabilities
can be used with signed authenticated values [17], or a simple
lightweight protocol can be designed for the authentication with
integrity. Our new SG authentication protocol has the following
features.
1) Provides mutual authentication between the EP and the
SM, between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-
GW, between the SM and the HA, and between the NAN-
GW and the CC.
2) Provides a secure solution for the consumers to easily
choose or change the EP of their own choice. The protocol
also provides more satisfaction to the consumer as he/she
will have the control over its HA (secured with a password
shared between the SM and all HA, and only he/she can
change it).
3) Defeats security attacks: defeats flood-based DoS attacks
targeting transmitted messages between the SM/HAN-GW
and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW; protects the SM and the EP
from redirection attacks as Zip codes are verified at both
ends; preserves the privacy of each message as it is en-
crypted before being transmitted over the network; pro-
vides resistances against ID thefts, MITM attacks, replay
attacks, brute-force attacks, repudiation attacks, and im-
personation attacks.
4) Lightweight in terms of communication (CMO) and com-
putation overheads (CPO). The execution time of 3.96 s
can be considered fast, as it is for all the involved entities
in the SG network and is within the requirements (few
minutes) set by the standards [8].
5) Uses cloud-based trusted authorities (TA) for key man-
agement, which does not have the key exchange or PKI
issues. Instead, the TA generates partial public and private
keys, and the legitimate device generates its actual public
and private keys.
D. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II dis-
cusses related work, and Section III presents our SG system
model. A new authentication protocol is proposed in Section IV.
Security and performance analysis is presented in Section V, in-
cluding a formal proof of the protocol. Section VI presents the
conclusion of this paper.
Table I summarizes different symbols and abbreviations used
in the paper along with their descriptions and sizes. Note that
the sizes of public and private keys depend on the algorithm
used in asymmetric encryption.
II. RELATED WORK
We first discuss the existing authentication protocols that pro-
vide authentications between various entities with lower over-
head, and then those that provide protection against security
attacks and preserves the privacy over the SG network.
For providing low overheads, a lightweight authentication
scheme based on the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol
and a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) was
proposed in [1]. However, it provides mutual authentication
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TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Symbol Description Size (bits)
H1 ()/H2 () Hash functions used in ciphering —
H3 () Hash function for SK key generation —
H3 change () Hash function for changing the password —
h() Hash function for computing e —
ID Identity of the entity 128
e Hash value 128
MAC Message authentication code 64
PUK Public key 160
PRK Private key 160
SK Shared secret key 256
T Timestamp 64
K Random number 128
Zip Postal code 128
S Signature 128
pwd Password shared between SM and HAs 128
Z Sum of products of K and ID 128
P Sum of products of PRK and ID 128
R Sum of products of S and ID 128
only between the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW. Sule et al. [18]
made a change in [1] by using an MAC between the AMI de-
vices and the controller nodes instead of HMAC. Although this
scheme reduces the verification time, it also reduces the protocol
security provided by the function. As in [1], the scheme only in-
volves the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW communication. Further,
an authentication scheme using a batch signature verification
was proposed in [19]. However, the scheme does not focus on
authentication among SM, HAN, and HA, rather authenticat-
ing data aggregation. A key agreement protocol for the SG is
proposed in [20], which reduces the number of hash functions
used and the delay caused by the security process. Recently,
an identity-based scheme is proposed to provide authentication
between the SM and the AS, and reduces the total number of
exchanged packets, but increases the CPO [21].
Many researchers have proposed solutions in order to resist
against different attacks in the SG system, such as replay, MITM,
impersonation, and DoS. However, in the absence of authentica-
tion, an attacker can easily tamper the message and/or can send
a fabricated message. In this direction, a mutual authentication
scheme between the SM and the data concentration unit (DCU)
was proposed to prevent impersonation and MITM attacks [22].
However, this scheme neither discusses the generated overhead
nor provides authentication in a home environment. Recently,
an authentication scheme using a Merkle hash tree technique
was proposed to prevent replay, injection, and message mod-
ification attacks [23]. However, communication only between
the HAN and the NAN is considered. A Diffie–Hellman-based
secure aggregation scheme for collecting data was presented
in [24], which generates lower CPO and CMO, but the scheme
does not consider SM’s authentication. Kursawe et al. [25] stated
that a strong authentication technique is required for all users
and devices within the SG network. It is expected that in the
near future, due to the increase in the number of devices, the
current protocols may not be scalable.
In addition, the privacy of the customers in terms of power
usage, billing, and other information must be preserved dur-
ing the authentication. In this direction, an identity-based
authentication protocol is proposed to provide source authen-
tication, data integrity, nonrepudiation services, and privacy
preservation in AMI [26]. However, the protocol does not con-
sider overhead and efficiency. Yan et al. [27] proposed an inte-
grated authentication and confidentiality protocol that provides
a mutual authentication between the SM and the AMI network,
and enables data privacy, integrity, and confidentiality. However,
the protocol generates a large overhead as it performs several
encryption/decryption operations. Further, it does not consider
EP and HA entities in the authentication system.
In summary, several standard, lightweight, and privacy-
preserved protocols have been proposed by researchers. How-
ever, the existing standard protocols do not provide sufficient
security and privacy preservation to the SG system. Also,
many existing protocols (including privacy-preserved) are inef-
ficient and generate large overheads. Furthermore, the existing
lightweight and privacy-preserved protocols are with limited
capability of authenticating only few entities (mostly two de-
vices) in the SG. In other words, these protocols do not enable
authentication among all entities with optimized resource uti-
lization. Moreover, embedding security to the existing protocols
generates large overheads and requires integration to authenti-
cate all entities of the SG network, which results in inefficient
and costly solutions. Therefore, there is a need of an integrated
lightweight authentication protocol that provides mutual authen-
tication from end-to-end, protects the SG system from known
attacks, and keeps the privacy preserved. We tackle this problem
in this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the SG system, security operations are usually assumed
to be done independently by individual center. However, due
to limited processing capability, these centers do not support
online analysis and generate high maintenance cost [28]. Fur-
ther, the SG requires a powerful platform with effective in-
tegration and ubiquitous seamless access to collect and ana-
lyze large data collected from a variety of sources, such as
AMI, wide area measurement system (WAMS), and HA. Re-
cent studies [29]–[32] show that cloud computing is very much
compatible with the SG system because of its several advan-
tages, including energy efficiency, flexibility, scalability, agility,
and cost effectiveness. Various researchers have proposed their
solutions by integrating cloud computing in the SG system.
Baek et al. [30] designed a big data information management
framework, called Smart-Frame, based on a cloud computing
model. Also, Jiang et al. [33] proposed a scheme for search-
able encryption on the cloud database in the SG, and Bitzer
and Gebretsadik [34] presented a feasibility study of monitor-
ing renewable energy in the SG based on a cloud computing
framework retaining SG security. Developing a secure cloud
network is not our goal in this paper. However, we consider
that our scheme uses secure cloud servers as discussed in [30],
[33], and [34]. We employ the cloud computing into our SG
system, particularly [30], which builds a hierarchical structure
of cloud computing centers. Employing cloud computing in the
SG not only addresses the issue of large information manage-
ment, but also provides a high energy and cost saving platform.
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Fig. 2. Hierarchy of TAs.
A roadmap in [35] presents a realistic example of deploying
cloud computing centers in the SG system.
We propose to have a cyber-security layer on the top of com-
munication layer that takes care of the security issues existing in
the communication between any two entities over the network.
Our SG system is divided into several regions/areas, each of
which is managed by either a public or private, but secure cloud
computing center [30]. As shown in Fig. 2, we consider three
different tiers in our SG system as follows:
1) Tier-1: Central cloud computing center;
2) Tier-2: Distributed cloud computing centers;
3) Tier-3: SMs, GWs, and EPs.
As shown in Fig. 2, there are n distributed cloud computing
centers, also called trusted authorities (TAs). Each TA manages
a region that includes various SMs, GWs, and EPs. The tier-1
TA provides inter-TA communication among different entities
within the system, while the tier-2 TAs are responsible for man-
aging the public key repository, and generating partial public and
private keys of devices at their ends. The main purpose of en-
abling cloud environment in our SG system is to provide an easy
and fast access to the public key repository and to efficiently gen-
erate public and private key pairs. In addition, the SG requires a
powerful computing platform to handle a large-scale data anal-
ysis and to support complex real-time application services. In
each TA, various cloud computing services can be deployed,
such as infrastructure-as-a-service for SG information collec-
tion, processing and storage, platform-as-a-service for devel-
oping and integrating cloud computing specific security-based
applications for the SG environment, and software-as-a-service
for specific services, such as optimization of energy usage.
IV. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
This section proposes an authentication protocol for the SG
system. We first present an overview of our protocol, then
present mutual authentication approaches between different SG
entities. The authentication between EP-SM, SM-GW, and SM-
HA are based on asymmetric key cryptography, asymmetric
key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key cryptography,
respectively.
A. Overview
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) is considered
suitable for securing grid and cloud computing environments
[36], [37]. However, IBC suffers from the key escrow problem
[38]. Our protocol is based on a certificateless cryptosystem,
which is a combination of identity-based cryptography and tra-
ditional public key cryptography [39]. Our approach not only
overcomes the key escrow problem in IBC, but also does not
require traditional PKI that is costly due to the private key gen-
eration. We instead use a key generation center (KGC). The
security of our scheme is based on the security of elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for the group of points
over the finite field. Here, we let E be an elliptic curve defined
over a finite field Fp as E : y2 = x3 + Ax + B;A,B ∈ Fp . Let
E1 and E2 be points in E(Fp) and integer x is found such that
E1 = xE2 . We do not design a pairing based scheme under
ECC, but design a certificateless-based asymmetric encryption
scheme. This is because a multiplication of points under ECC is
more efficient than a pairing operation. For instance, it takes 0.6
ms for a point multiplication and 4.5 ms for a pairing operation
under the same setting [40]. The identity (ID) of each device
(EP, SM, GW, HA) in the SG network is taken from a random
point on elliptic curve over E(Fq ).
Each TA generates its private and public key pair, known as
a master private key and a master public key, and makes the
public key available to its users. Our approach is simpler than
the Diffie–Hellman protocol, as it uses one-way hash functions
instead of exponential functions. The KGC (at each TA) supplies
an entity with a partial private key (PPR) and a partial public key
(PPU). We assume that KGC securely delivers the partial keys
to the intended entities. Each entity then combines its partial
public and private keys with secret information to generate its
actual private and public keys. In this way, the entity’s private
key is not known to the KGC and the anonymity of the user’s
public key is also achieved. This anonymity is useful when we
consider that in order to receive the public key of a device, the
requested device must be verified authentic to the TA using its
partial key credentials.
First, we present generic definitions of the algorithms used in
our scheme, and then explain each of these algorithms in detail.
Definition 1: A generic certificateless public key encryption
scheme consists of the following algorithms.
1) Setup: The KGC generates a common public parameter
(param) and a master secret key (masterKey), and uses
these keys to generate different keys.
2) PartialKeyGeneration: TA uses param, masterKey, and an
identity ID (a point of elliptic curve group) received from
a user to generate a PPR and a PPU as (PPU, PPR) =
PartialKeyExtract (param, masterKey, ID).
3) SecretValue: Each user/device generates a unique secret
value SID using a random number rand as SID = Secret-
Value(rand, ID).
4) GenPrivateKey: User/device uses param, PPR, and
SID to generate private key PRK as PRK = GenPri-
vateKey(param, PPR, SID).
5) GenPublicKey: User/device uses param, PPU, SID, and
ID to generate public key PUK as PUK = GenPub-
licKey(param, PPU, SID, ID).
6) Encrypt: The plaintext M is encrypted using param and
PUK to generate a ciphertext C as C = Encrypt(param,
PUK, M ).
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Fig. 3. Authentication between the EP and the SM.
7) Decrypt: The ciphertext C is decrypted using param and
PRK to retrieve the plaintext M as M = Decrypt(param,
PRK, C).
The public key of each entity is available in a public repository
of the corresponding tier-2 cloud computing center (TA). The
private keys are kept secret and stored on the SMs, the GWs,
and the EPs. Since each entity is registered to a specific TA, it
knows the identity and the public key of the TA. The details of
generating different keys are as follows.
1) Setup: t r←Z∗q is a random integer with large prime q,
and P is a generator of a large cyclic group G over
E(Fq ). Each TA generates its private and public key pair
as (PRKTA = t, PUKTA = tP ) . Let us define the hash
functions used in this protocol as H1 : Z∗q → {0, 1}∗,H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and H3 : Z∗q × Z∗q → {0, 1}∗. Returns
param = (q, P , PUKTA , H1 , H2 , H3) and masterKey =
(q, P , PRKTA , H1 , H2 , H3).
2) PartialKeyGeneration: TA chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q , and
computes w = sP and x = s + PRKTAH1(ID). Note that
ID is first converted from an elliptic curve point to a bit
string [41] in H1() and then is hashed. Returns (PPU,
PPR) = (w, x).
3) SecretValue: Each device generates a unique z ∈ Z∗q using
SecretValue() function. Returns SID = z.
4) GenPrivateKey: Each device computes its private key
PRK = (z, x). Returns PRK.
5) GenPublicKey: Each device computes its public key PUK
= (w, v), where v = zP . Returns PUK.
6) Encrypt: Sender device computes r = H2(M ||γ), where
M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a plaintext and γ ∈ {0, 1}∗. Further-
more, it computes ciphertext C = (c1 , c2 , c3) such that
c1 = rP ; c2 = rv + M ||γ; c3 = w + u; where u =
PUKTAH1(ID). Returns C.
7) Decrypt: Receiver device first applies PPR by computing
Ver1 = c3 − xP . If Ver1 = 0, it proceeds further, oth-
erwise terminates the connection. Thereafter, the device
retrieves the message M ||γ as c2 − zc1 and verifies Ver2
as H2(M ||γ)P ?= c1 . Returns M .
B. Authentication Between the EP and the SM
We assume that EP knows the identity of each SM that it
supplies the electricity to. Similarly, each SM also knows the
identity of its EP, as it has a contract with the EP. As shown in
Fig. 3, the authentication between the EP and the SM/HAN-GW
is carried out as follows:
Fig. 4. Authentication between the SM and the BAN/NAN-GW.
Step-1 EP→SM: [EPUKS M {IDEP ,K1 , ZipEP}, T1 ,
MAC1 ]: First, the EP retrieves the public key of the SM from
the repository stored at its tier-2, i.e., PUKSM . Then, the EP
encrypts its identity IDEP , a nonce K1 , and the location (Zip
code) ZipEP with the public key of the SM and sends it to the
SM along with a current timestamp T1 and an MAC1 (message-
1), where MAC1 = [EPUKS M {IDEP ,K1 , ZipEP}, T1 ]. We
consider each MAC as a HMAC function, i.e., HMACSHA256,
that uses a pre-assigned key, say K.
Step-2 SM→EP: [EPUKE P {IDSM ,K2 , ZipSM}, T2 , MAC2 ]:
On receiving message-1, the SM computes MAC′1 and checks
if MAC1
?=MAC′1 . If it is verified, the SM decrypts the message
using its private key. Then, the SM retrieves the public key of
the EP (PUKEP ) and verifies the identity and the location of the
EP. If it is verified, the SM sends (IDSM , K2 , ZipSM ) encrypted
with PUKEP to the EP along with T2 and MAC2 (message-2),
where MAC2 = [EPUKE P {IDSM ,K2 , ZipSM}, T2 ].
Step-3: On receiving message-2, the EP computes MAC′2 and
checks if MAC2
?=MAC′2 . If it is verified, the EP decrypts the
received message using its private key, and verifies the identity
and the location of the SM. If both are correct, the EP computes
a shared secret key as SK1 = H3(ZipEP ⊕K2 , ZipSM ⊕K1)
and sends message to the SM encrypted with this shared key.
Here, H3() is a one-way hash function. Similarly, the SM also
computes the same secret SK1 key.
C. Authentication Between the SM and the GW
We assume that a group of SMs sends its metering data to
a specific GW. The GW keeps a record of the identity of each
SM associated with it. A number of SMs communicates with a
GW simultaneously, so the authentication process is executed
in a batch. The authentication process and the communication
scenario of the proposed authentication scheme between a group
of SMs and the GW are shown in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 4, the authentication process is carried out as
follows:
Step-1 SMi→GW: [EPUKG W {IDSM i , Zi}, T3i ,MAC3i ]:
First, each SMi retrieves the identity and the public key of the
GW. Then, each SMi sends its identity and Zi encrypted with
PUKGW along with its current timestamp T3i and MAC3i to the
GW (message-1), where MAC3i = [EPUKG W {IDSM i , Zi}, T3i ]
and Zi = IDSM i Ki . The Ki ∈ [1, q-1] are the random secret val-
ues selected by each SMi .
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Fig. 5. Communication scenario between a group of SMs and the GW.
Step-2 GW→SMi: [EPUKS M i {IDGW , e}, T4i ,MAC4i ]: On
receiving message-1, the GW computes MAC′3i and checks mes-
sage integrity. If it is verified, the GW compares its current
timestamp tm with Tthreshold = T3i + , where  is the max-
imum allowed delay to transmit the message to the GW. If
tm > Tthreshold, the request is discarded and the connection is
terminated. Otherwise, the GW decrypts the message using its
private key, and verifies the identity of the SMi . If it is verified,
the GW checks the number of attempts by the SMi within a
specified interval. If it is more than the assigned limit, the con-
nection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW sends its identity and
a value e encrypted using the public key of the corresponding
SMi along with T4i and MAC4i (message-2) to the SMi . Here,
e = h(Z), h is a one-way hash function, Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi , and n
is the number of SMi communicating with the GW.
Step-3 SMi→GW: [EPUKG W {IDSM i , PSM i , SSM i }, T5i ,
MAC5i ]: On receiving message-2, each SMi computes MAC
′
4i
and verifies the integrity of each message. If it is verified, SMi
decrypts the messages using private keys PRKSM i , and veri-
fies the received identity of the GW. If it is verified, each SMi
stores e, and generates a variable PSM i = PRKSM i IDSM i and a
signature SSM i = (Ki + ePRKSM i ) mod n. Note that the first
128 bits of PPRKS M i are used in PSM i and SSM i for opera-
tions’ compatibility. Then, each SMi sends IDSM i , PSM i , and
SSM i encrypted using public key of the GW along with T5i and
MAC5i = [EPUKG W {IDSM i , PSM i , SSM i }, T5i ] (message-3) to
the GW. On receiving message-3, the GW computes MAC′5i and
checks message integrity. If it is verified, the GW decrypts the
messages, and verifies the identity of each SMi . In a scenario
where a group of SMi communicates with a GW, adversary may
possibly compromise some of the SMi to perform flood-based
DoS attacks. The compromised SMi can flood the victim GW
with fake message-3 by spoofing meters’ identities. Adversary
can even send an empty or a random message to the GW. This
leads to half-open authentication requests at the GW. Step-2 of
this protocol addresses such issues. In order to prevent these
attacks, the identity and signature of each SMi is verified. For
each unresponsive SMi , the GW removes the corresponding Zi





i=1 SSM i IDSM i , and verifies (R − eP ?= Z).
Fig. 6. Authentication between the HA and the SM.
Therefore, our scheme is efficient even with the presence
of invalid requests in a batch since the GW only needs to re-
compute Z, which is simply a summation of all Zi .
D. Authentication Between the HA and the SM
Since data generated and sent by all HAs belong to a par-
ticular user, we involve the end user (owner) for authenticating
the HAs (at the initial setup) [42]. The energy consumption in-
formation can reveal personal details of the consumers, such
as their daily routines (including times when they are at home
or asleep), what electronic equipment they own and are being
used, etc. Consumers expect that the privacy of this information
is maintained. We assume that the SM and all HAs share a pass-
word selected by the user. A secret key SK2 = H3(pwd, T ) is
generated each time a HA and the SM communicates, where pwd
is the shared password, T is a timestamp, and H3 is a one-way
hash function. As shown in Fig. 6, the authentication process
between the HA and the SM is carried out as follows:
Step-1 HA→SM: [TIDHA , T6 ,MAC6 ]: First, each HA gen-
erates SK2 from a shared password and uses it to encrypt the
original identity of the HA. Then, it sends a temporary iden-
tity TIDHA , a timestamp T6 , and MAC6 to the SM (message-1),
where MAC6 = [TIDHA , T6 ] and SK2 = H3(pwd, T6). The
encryption can be performed by any standard symmetric key
algorithm, such as AES-CTR or MAES-CTR [43].
Step-2 SM→HA: [TIDSM , T7 ,MAC7 ]: On receiving
message-1, the SM verifies MAC′6 with the received MAC6 . If it
is verified, the SM decrypts and recovers the actual identity of
the HA. If the identity belongs to one of its HA, it generates a
temporary identity TIDSM and sends its identity to the HA along
with T7 and MAC7 (message-2), where MAC7 = [TIDSM , T7 ].
On receiving message-2, the HA computes MAC′7 and com-
pares it with MAC7 , and further decrypts and recovers the actual
identity of the SM. If it is correct, the HA and the SM can start
communicating using messages encrypted by SK2 . Moreover,
the password can be automatically changed at a regular interval
by calculating pwdi+1 = N ×H3change(d× pwdi), where N is
the number of days, d is a random secret, and H3change() is a hash
function. For the password change, the user needs to provide N
to the SM. When, a new password is generated at SM, the SM
encrypts the password using last session key and sends it to all
the HAS before discarding the previous key.
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E. Authentication Between the NAN-GW and the CC
We assume that the NAN-GW aggregates the received data
from different SMs. The CC is assumed to be connected to the
NAN-GW using wired network and is authenticated. In case, if
it is wireless connected, the scenario similar to EP-SM provides
mutual authentication.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents the verification proofs, defenses against
security attacks, and security and performance analysis of our
protocol in comparison with the existing lightweight protocols.
A. Verification Proof
We present the verification proofs for public decryption of our
public encryption scheme, and the correctness of the protocol
between SMs and their corresponding GW.
1) Verification of Decryption in Our Encryption Scheme:
V er1 = c3 − xP
= w + u− xP
= sP + PUKTAH1(ID)− [s + PRKTAH1(ID)]P
= sP + PRKTAH1(ID)P − sP − PRKTAH1(ID)P
= 0.
V er2 = H2(M ||γ)P ?= c1
= H2(M ||γ)P ?= rP
= H2(M ||γ)P ?= H2(M ||γ)P.
2) Correctness of the Protocol Between SMi-GW:




= IDSM1 K1 + IDSM2 K2 + · · ·+ IDSMn Kn .
R.H.S. = R− eP
= (SSM1 IDSM1 + SSM2 IDSM2 + · · ·+ SSMn
IDSMn )− e(PSM1 + PSM2 + · · ·+ PSMn )
= ((K1 + e(PRKSM1 ))IDSM1 + (K2 + e
(PRKSM2 ))IDSM2 + · · ·+ (Kn + e(PRKSMn ))
IDSMn )− e(PSM1 +PSM2 + · · ·+PSMn )
= (IDSM1 K1 + IDSM2 K2 + · · ·+ IDSMn Kn ) + e
((PRKSM1 )IDSM1 + (PRKSM2 )IDSM2
+ · · ·+ (PRKSMn )IDSMn )− e(PSM1
+PSM2 + · · ·+ PSMn )
= (IDSM1 K1 + IDSM2 K2 + · · ·+ IDSMn Kn ) + e
(PSM1 + PSM2 + · · ·+ PSMn )− e(PSM1 +
PSM2 + · · ·+ PSMn )
= IDSM1 K1 + IDSM2 K2 + · · ·+ IDSMn Kn = Z.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SECURITY CAPABILITIES
Vulnerabilities [20] [1] [21] Proposed
MITM attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Replay attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brute-force attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Redirection attacks No No No Yes
Flood-based DoS attacks Partial No Partial Yes
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED
Requirements [20] [1] [21] Proposed
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Privacy preservation No Yes No Yes
Prevents ID thefts No Yes No Yes
B. Defenses Against Security Attacks
We assume that an adversary A has a complete knowledge
about the system topology, as well as the identities and public
keys of the entities. A may be an internal entity or an external
entity. A may attempt to launch MITM attacks on the active
connections between any two entities of the SG network. Since
all messages over the network are encrypted, inherently, MITM
attacks will not be successful to modify the transmitted informa-
tion. Replay attacks are also prevented as each message over the
network contains a unique timestamp value. As discussed in Sec-
tion IV-C, the proposed protocol also defeats flood-based DoS
attacks. In addition, impersonation attacks are prevented, since
the fake request is discarded and the connection is terminated.A
does not have the actual private key/shared secret key of the valid
entity and therefore cannot decrypt the transmitted message. The
key size of each shared secret key and public key/private key is
chosen to be longer than 128 bits to resist against brute-force
attacks. Furthermore, the Zip codes sent by the devices are used
to overcome redirection attacks. Table II shows a comparison
of the security capabilities of the proposed protocol with the
existing protocols. Note that [20] and [21] partially protect DoS
attacks by simply limiting the key agreement sessions.
C. Security Analysis
The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication be-
tween the EP and the SM, between the SM and the GW, and be-
tween the SM and the HA. Our protocol also provides a perfect
forward secrecy, since the adversary A can neither retrieve the
actual key nor predict any of the future keys using a shared secret
key. Furthermore, our protocol preserves the privacy of com-
municated entities over the network and overcomes ID thefts, as
the transmitted messages are always encrypted. Table III shows
a comparison of security requirements. Note that we have a
system with |K| = |C| = |P |, each of 128 bits (with AES-
CTR) or 256 bits (with MAES-CTR) for symmetric encryption
and |K| ≥ |C|= |P | for asymmetric encryption. Therefore, our
system has perfect secrecy as each key is used with equal prob-
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ability 1/|K|, and for each plaintext P and ciphertext C, there
is a unique key K such that EK (P) = C. As well, our system
with at least equal size spaces |P |=|C|=|K| is perfectly key
ambiguous as the keys are picked uniformly, and for all x ∈ P ,
y ∈ C, there is a unique key K such that y = EK (x).
Furthermore, A cannot retrieve the partial and actual private
keys of any device. Even in other scenarios where A extracts
any one of these parameters 1) PPR, 2) PPU, and 3) public key,
or replaces the public key of the device, our public encryption
scheme is able to defend such attacks asA cannot retrieve the ac-
tual private key and cannot decrypt the message. Let us consider
two scenarios in which A tries to extract some information.
Scenario-1: A does not have access to the masterKey, but
may replace public keys (PUK) of the devices with any value,
and also requests the public key of victim device, extracts the
PPR, and makes decryption queries. Under this scenario,A has
following restrictions:
1) A cannot extract the PPR of the challenge device ID at
any point, as the fake ID will be discarded by the TA;
2) A cannot request the private key (PRK) of any identity, if
the respective public key (PUK) has been replaced;
3) A cannot make a decryption query on the challenge ci-
phertext C that was generated by a combination of (ID,
PUK).
Scenario-2:A does have access to the masterKey, but may not
replace public keys (PUK) of the devices. A can compute PPR
of any device, and also can request public key and make private
key extraction and decryption queries. Under this scenario, A
has following restrictions:
1) A cannot replace the public key (PUK) of any device at
any time, as the identity and public key repositories are
stored at various TA;
2) A cannot extract the private key (PRK) of the challenge
device at any time, as it is randomly selected by each
device;
3) A cannot successfully decrypt the challenge ciphertext C
on behalf of the victim device, as it may generate PPR of
the device, but does not have the actual private key (PRK)
of the device.
Definition 2: A protocol is secure against adaptive chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and chosen ciphertext attack (IND-
CCA) for symmetric and asymmetric key cryptosystems, respec-
tively, if no polynomial bounded adversary has a nonnegligible
advantage. Therefore, our protocol is secure against IND-CPA
and IND-CCA.
Our system is secure in terms of indistinguishability as A
cannot identify the message choice because of a unique com-
bination of P and K for each transmitted message C. Here,
Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is
equivalent to the property of semantic security. In our protocol,
symmetric encryption is performed by AES-CTR, which is IND-
CPA secure. Also, the asymmetric encryption, performed by the
proposed scheme, is based on ECC and is indistinguishable un-
der chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) considering hardness
of the ECDLP [44].
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR A SINGLE AUTHENTICATION TOKEN
Performance
Parameter































A mutual authentication between the HAN-GW and the BAN-
GW is proposed in [1], and a mutual authentication between the
SM and the AS of the DCU-GW is proposed in [21]. A number
of authentication scenarios between SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW,
NAN-GW, and HA are presented in [20], whereas our proto-
col proposes mutual authentication between EP, SM, HAN-GW,
BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and HA. This section computes and com-
pares CMO and CPO among these four protocols, and evaluates
total execution time of the proposed protocol.
The total CMO and the total CPO of the protocol for a single
authentication token are calculated, respectively, as CMOtotal
= CMOEP-SM + CMOSM -GW + CMOSM -HA and CPOtotal =
CPOEP-SM + CPOSM -GW + CPOSM -HA + CPOkey-gen. Table IV
shows a comparison of the CMO and CPO of our protocol with
the existing protocols [1], [20], [21]. Out of these three existing
protocols, it is fair to compare our protocol with only the proto-
col in [20], as only this protocol includes most of the involved
entities in the SG, while only two entities are involved in [1]
and [21]. Although, the protocol in [20] and our protocol cover
a similar range of entities, our protocol achieves much lower
overhead. In detail, authentication scenario between the EP-SM
generates CMO of 1024 bits and prevents MITM, replay, im-
personation, and redirection attacks. The scenario between the
SM-GW generates 1216 bits of CMO and prevents MITM, re-
play, impersonation, repudiation, and flood-based DoS attacks.
In comparison with the protocol in [1], our protocol is also re-
sistant against flood-based DoS attacks while adding just 24 bits
of CMO. Furthermore, in the authentication scenario between
the SM-HA, our protocol prevents MITM, replay, impersonation,
and brute-force attacks while generating 512 bits of CMO.
We also evaluate the performance of our protocol when there
are multiple authentication tokens. We assume that there are m
users executing the protocol simultaneously and each user has n
HAs. The CMO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated
as CMO(m,n) = CMO(EP -SM)m + CMO(SM -GW )m
+ CMO(SM -HA)n = 1024m + 1216m + 512n = 2240m +
512n. The CPO generated by the proposed protocol is calcu-
lated as CPO(m,n) = (5 m + 2n)E + (5m + 2n)D + (3m +
n + 1)H + (10m + 4n)MAC + 1ESUB + 4mEMUL + 1MUL
+ mADD + (2m-2)EADD + 4mXOR. Here, E and D repre-
sent encryption and decryption, respectively, XOR is bit-wise
exclusive-OR, MUL and ADD are scalar multiplication and ad-
dition over integers/binaries, respectively, EMUL, EADD, and
ESUB are elliptic curve multiplication, addition and subtraction
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Fig. 7. Communication overhead.
(all three are computed as additions), respectively, and H and
MAC are hash and authentication code functions, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that there are r malicious users in a
batch. The protocol first removes invalid requests of the mali-
cious users and then computes other parameters before further
executing the protocol. In such case, the total recalculated CPO
is as CPO(m,n, r) = CPO(m,n) − rMUL − 2rEMUL −
rESUB − 2(r−1)EADD. Since XOR operations are negligible
in comparison with other operations, they are not included in
calculation of CPO.
Figs. 7 and 8, respectively, show the CMO and CPO gener-
ated by the proposed protocol for different number of users
(m = 10, 50, 100) and HAs (n = 1, 5, 10, 20), consider-
ing unit value for each operation. In Fig. 7, CMO(10, 1) =
2864 bytes, CPO(10, 1) = 38.75 bytes, CMO(100, 20) =
29280 bytes, and CPO(100, 20) = 397.625 bytes. In Fig. 8,
CPO(100, 5, 1) = 380 bytes, CPO(100, 10, 50) = 348.875
bytes, and CPO(100, 20, 99) = 323.375 bytes (worst case).
Hence, even if there are some invalid requests r (Fig. 8(b): 1,
m/2, and m−1) in a batch, the protocol efficiently handles them.
E. Simulation Result
We simulated the protocol in Java environment with JDK1.7,
Intel Core i3-4500U CPU 1.7 GHz, 2GB RAM, and Windows7
OS. For a single authentication token, the scalar addition and
multiplication operations over integer/binaries took 0.000933
and 0.00918 ms, single addition and doubling over elliptic curve
took 0.6031 and 0.6047 ms, hash function SHA256 took 0.9 ms,
HMAC function HMACSHA256 took 271.60 ms, and encryp-
tion and decryption times of symmetric MAES-CTR mode with
256 bits key between EP-SM and SM-HA took 0.97 and 0.78
ms, respectively. Moreover, the asymmetric encryption 1) using
RSA with 2048 bits key and 2) using certificateless public en-
cryption scheme took (30, 16) ms and (12, 7.6) ms, respectively.
The total computation time by our protocol using RSA and us-
ing proposed scheme is 4041.91 and 3962.71 ms, respectively.
This computation time can be further reduced by using the fast
multiplication, where a single addition and doubling take ap-
proximately half of the ordinary ECC multiplication, i.e., 0.303
ms [45]. The total messages (2752 bits) transmission times on
3G and 4G networks [46] by our protocol are 0.000451 and
0.000182 ms, respectively. Hence, the total execution time by
our protocol (with certificateless cipher scheme) on 3G and 4G
networks of approximately 3.96 s is quite reasonable, consid-
ering that it is the total time for completing authentication for
all involved entities in the SG network. Here, we presented just
one case for the overall protocol execution time. However, if
we encrypt the message with AES-CTR/MAES-CTR for sym-
metric encryption, and the symmetric key is encrypted by an
asymmetric algorithm, the overall time can be further reduced.
Keys generation of different entities are considered as a pre-
execution phase, as all keys are generated before the protocol
run starts. The key generation time varies with the generated
random numbers and elliptic curve addition and doubling oper-
ations in our scheme. Let a represent the number of operations
for elliptic curve addition and doubling points, and let b repre-
sent the number of devices deployed in the network. A random
number generation takes 0.69 ms. Then, the generation time for
the private and public master keys, i.e., PRKTA and PUKTA
are 0.69 and 0.60a ms, respectively. The total generation times
for private keys (z, x) and public keys (w, v) are (0.69, 0.01)b
ms and (0.60a, 0.60a)b ms, respectively. Therefore, total key
generation time of our scheme is 0.69 + 0.60 a + b(0.70 +
1.20a) ms.
F. Formal Proof of the Properties of the Protocol
In order to justify our analysis, we use the BAN-Logic to
provide a formal proof of our scheme. The notations used in
BAN-Logic can be referred from [47].
1) Message Meaning Rule:
1) Rule shown at the bottom of the page.
2) Rule shown at the bottom of the page.
2) Timestamp Verification Rule:
1) SMi | ≡ #(Ti), SMi | ≡ GW | ∼ msg1 ∧msg3
SMi | ≡ GW | ≡ msg1 ∧msg3
2) GW | ≡ #(Tj ), GW | ≡ SMi | ∼ msg2
SMi | ≡ GW | ≡ msg2 .
3) Jurisdiction Rule:
1) HA| ≡ SM ⇒ TIDHA ,HAHA| ∼ TIDHA
HA| ≡ SM
2) SM | ≡ HA ⇒ TIDSM , SMSM | ∼ TIDSM
SM | ≡ HA .
EP | ≡ (EP SK 1↔ SM), EPE{IDM P ,K1 , ZipEP}PUKS M
EP | ≡ SM | ∼ E{IDEP ,K1 , ZipEP}PUKS M
SM | ≡ (SM SK 1↔ EP ), SME{IDSM ,K2 , ZipSM}PUKE P
SM | ≡ EP | ∼ E{IDSM ,K2 , ZipSM}PUKE P
.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
SAXENA AND CHOI: INTEGRATED DISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS 11
Fig. 8. Computation overhead. (a) m = 10, 50, 100; n = 1, 5, 10, 20. (b) m = 10, 50, 100; n = 5, 10, 20; r = 1, m/2, m−1.
4) Protocol Goals:
a) Mutual Authentication: EP | ≡ SM ∧ EP→ SM | ≡ EP ∧
SM. Thus, mutual authentication holds.
b) Session Key Agreement: Each key SK1 between each EP
and the SM provides session key agreement.
c) Freshness of messages: SM | ≡ #(Tj ) ∧ EP | ≡ #(Ti).
Hence, freshness of messages between the EP and the SM holds.
d) Integrity and Privacy between the EP and the SM:
1) EP | ≡ (EP
SK 1↔ SM), EPHMAC{msg}
EP | ≡ SM | ∼ msg
2) EP | ≡ (EP
SK 1↔ SM), EPE{ID}SK1
EP | ≡ SM | ∼ ID .
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed protocol, based on hierarchical cloud TAs, pro-
vides mutual authentication between the EP and the SM, be-
tween the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW, between
the SM and the HA, and between the NAN-GW and the CC.
Particularly, the authentications between EP-SM and GW-CC,
SM-GW, and SM-HA are, respectively, based on asymmetric
key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and
symmetric key cryptography. Processing requests in a batch im-
proves the efficiency of the system, as a large number of SMs
communicate with the GW simultaneously for mutual authen-
tication. The certificateless scheme in the proposed protocol
maintains privacy preservation as the transmitted message is al-
ways encrypted over the network. Simulation results show that
the authentication scenarios between the EP-SM, the SM-GW,
and the SM-HA generate lower CMO and CPO in comparison
with the existing protocols. Also, the overhead generated by our
protocol are manageable, even when invalid requests exist in a
batch. Through security analysis, we show that our protocol is
secure against existing attacks, such as MITM attacks, replay
attacks, impersonation attacks, redirection attacks, and flood-
based DoS attacks. In sum, our protocol is lightweight with low
execution time and efficiently provides a centrally integrated
control in a decentralized environment. Furthermore, our pro-
tocol can be readily integrated with the cloud computing-based
trusted entities to utilize powerful computing services of the
cloud for efficiently managing the SG system.
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